As anticipated in the March issue of our newsletter, the energy crisis is gradually moving out of the conjunctural dimension and taking on the features of a structural risk, with direct implications for the business continuity of organizations.

Recent geopolitical dynamics and tensions on major international energy corridors are highlighting a key element: the system is not breaking down, but degrading. AsCenter for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)analyses point out, the global capacity to offset significant shocks to energy flows remains limited, leading to operating conditions characterized by intermittent availability, volatility, and increasing difficulty in planning.

In parallel, market assessments-including those ofAllianz Trade-confirmthat the price signal represents only a superficial manifestation. The real impact materializes in the physical markets: reduced industrial run rates, logistics congestion, rising insurance premiums, and strains on energy and derivative supply chains.

Added to this is an additional, often underestimated element: demand-side management. TheInternational Energy Agency (IEA)highlights how, in contexts of energy stress, governments can directly intervene in consumption through measures such as operating restrictions for energy-hungry industries, the spread of smart working, reductions in available power and forms of scheduled load shedding.

The point of discontinuity is clear: energy is no longer just an economic variable, but an operational constraint.

Operational implications: what resilience managers need to do today

It is reasonable to expect that the most impactful decisions-such as mandatory downtime days, consumption restrictions or imposition of smart working-will be determined at the state or supranational level. However, this does not reduce the operational responsibility of organizations; on the contrary, it anticipates the need for preparation.

In this context, the role of the resilience manager evolves from a reactive function to asystemic anticipationfunction.

1. Structured planning and energy scenarios

It is necessary to update Business Continuity Plan and contingency plans by including scenarios of:

• partial reduction in energy availability
• intermittent and repeated blackouts
• regulatory constraints on consumption
• externally imposed operational limitations

It is no longer a matter of planning for total disruption, but prolonged management of degraded conditions.

2. Review of existing strategies (lesson learned pandemic)

The experiences gained during the pandemic represent an immediately reusable operational asset.

They must be:

• reexamined
• Updated from the current organizational structure
• rapidly actionable yields

In particular:

• smart working
• remoting of non-core activities
• distributed operations management

3. Preventive management of critical inventories and dependencies

Increasing safety stocks is one of the most immediate and concrete levers:

• feedstock
• semi-finished products
• critical components

With twofold objective:

• mitigate physical deficiencies
• absorb price volatility

This also includes:

• technical gases
• indirect energy-related materials
• components with high geographic concentration

4. Energy security of critical systems

Special attention should be paid to security and continuity systems:

• fire pumps
• generator sets
• UPS

It is essential to verify:

• real autonomy
• fuel availability
• reliability of starter systems

In an energy crisis scenario, the loss of security systems is a risk multiplier.

5. Preparation for frequent power outages and instability

The focus shifts to:

• short but repeated interruptions
• network instability
• variations in power quality

This implies a review of:

• production cycles
• batch logics
• shutdown and restart procedures

6. Contracting and delivery priorities.

Under conditions of scarcity, availability is uneven.

It becomes essential:

• verify allocation and priority clauses
• review force majeure
• negotiate preferential positioning

The risk is not not having suppliers, but not being served.

7. Mapping real energy dependence

It is not enough to know aggregate consumption.

Understanding is needed:

• which processes are critical
• Which ones are energy intensive but not essential
• which can be modulated or suspended

This mapping is critical to manage:

• rations
• time constraints
• load shedding

8. Black-start capability and plant restart

One area that is often overlooked concerns restart capacity.

They need to be clarified:

• real restart times
• operational sequences
• priority between systems

Many operational impacts result from the reboot, not the blackout.

9. Extended supply chain (N-th party risk)

Resilience does not stop at the first level of delivery.

Understanding is needed:

• energy dependence of suppliers
• backup availability
• indirect logistical vulnerabilities

Fragility is often hidden in the lower levels of the supply chain.

10. Logistics and transportation

Energy tensions are directly reflected in the mobility of goods.

It is necessary to evaluate:

• transport capacity reduction
• increased costs
• logistical priorities

And consider:

• decentralized stocks
• transportation alternatives
• greater operational flexibility

11. Workforce resilience

People become a critical factor.

They need to be evaluated:

• removable roles
• dependencies on individual skills
• impacts of external constraints
• Unacceptable working conditions (no air conditioning)

12. Sensitivity of assets and auxiliary systems

Not only production.

Attention to:

• refrigeration systems
• data center
• controlled environments
• product quality

The main risk is often degradation, not disruption.

13. Physical and cyber security in degraded conditions

In unstable energy scenarios:

• security systems can fail
• access controls degrade
• IT systems become vulnerable

Need to ensure:

• minimum autonomy
• safe operating modes even degraded

14. Governance and decision-making

Element often underestimated but crucial.

They must be defined ex-ante:

• decision-making roles
• activation thresholds
• priority criteria

In crisis, the problem is not lack of options, but slow decision-making.

15. Communication

Finally, communication management becomes an integral part of resilience.

It is necessary:

• internal alignment
• transparency to customers
• consistency with suppliers

Conclusion

The evidence converges on one point: the energy crisis does not occur as a sudden event, but as a gradual erosion of operating conditions.

The price of energy remains an indicator.
Resilience is measured in the ability to operate when that signal reflects a structural tension in the system.

It is no longer about managing the exception, but about governing normality under degraded conditions